




**Directorate of
Intelligence**

25X1

Top Secret



USSR Monthly Review



25X1

January 1982

ARMY review completed.

NGA Review Completed

Top Secret

SOV UR 82-001 IX

January 1982

25X1

Page Denied



**Directorate of
Intelligence**

Top Secret

25X1

USSR Monthly Review

25X1

January 1982

This publication of the Office of Soviet Analysis contains substantive findings and analytical judgments that are preliminary in nature and have not been formally coordinated with other CIA and Intelligence Community components.

25X1

Comments and queries regarding the articles are welcome. They may be directed to the authors,

25X1

Top Secret

SOV UR 82-001JX

January 1982

25X1

25X1

Top Secret

25X1

Contents

Page

1	Delays in Soviet Naval Production		25X1
	The Soviets are having difficulties coordinating the completion of new naval weapon systems with the completion of the submarines and ships for which they are intended. As a result, full operational capability for the Typhoon nuclear-powered ballistic missile submarine and units of two new classes of destroyers is likely to be delayed for one to two years.		25X1
			25X1
			25X1
5	Soviet Truck Production: Military Growth and Civilian Shortfalls		25X1
	The USSR has doubled its truck production in the past 15 years and is now the world's third-largest truck producer. Nevertheless, because of the heavy military demand, the requirements of the civilian sector are not being met.		25X1
			25X1
9	Readiness Monitoring in the Warsaw Pact Forces		25X1
	The systems used to monitor readiness within the Pact leave little room for local initiative, are administratively burdensome, and are of questionable value in measuring the readiness of units to carry out assigned combat missions. They do, however, provide data for planning rapid mobilization and determining postmobilization training requirements.		25X1
			25X1
13	Changes in Latest Soviet Statistical Handbook		25X1
	Despite an unusually large reduction in the size of the latest edition of the USSR's main statistical handbook, <i>Narodnoye khozyaystvo SSR</i> , there were few deletions of significance. There is no reason to believe, however, that the trend of growing impoverishment of Soviet statistical reporting has ended.		25X1
			25X1

Top Secret

25X1

SOV UR 82-001JX

January 1982

25X1

Top Secret

25X1

Delays in Soviet Naval Production

25X1

The Soviets are having difficulties coordinating the completion of new naval weapon systems with the completion of the submarines and ships for which they are intended. The Typhoon nuclear-powered ballistic missile submarine (SSBN) and units of two new classes of guided-missile destroyers currently are on sea trials without one of their major weapon systems, apparently because the missing systems are not yet operational. As a result, full operational capability for these classes is likely to be delayed for one to two years. Such problems have occurred in the past but may be growing as more complex naval units are produced.

Typhoon

The Typhoon SSBN program is the most telling example of Soviet difficulties in completing weapon systems and platforms concurrently. The first unit of the class went on sea trials in June 1981 and could become operational in early 1982. The new SS-NX-20 submarine-launched ballistic missile (SLBM), which the Typhoon will carry, probably will not be operational until about 1984. The delay is particularly significant because, unlike major surface combatants, which have multiple wartime missions, SSBNs have a single main purpose—to conduct nuclear strikes. Thus, the Typhoon is likely to be without its only major offensive system for roughly two years following completion of sea trials.

Sovremennyy

The Sovremennyy-class guided-missile destroyer, designed primarily for antisurface warfare, still is without its new antiship cruise missile, the SS-NX-22. The first unit of the class began sea trials in August 1980 without any of its major weapon systems. The ship's new 130-mm guns¹ were added in the fall of 1980, the two quadruple launchers for the SS-NX-22 were first observed on the ship in February 1981, and the two single-arm launchers for the SA-NX-7 surface-to-air missile (SAM) system had been installed by June 1981. The second Sovremennyy-class ship began sea trials in September 1981, also without these weapons. The Soviets have had difficulties with all of the Sovremennyy's new weapon systems, but the SS-NX-22 program appears to be the furthest behind schedule.

25X1

25X1

The SS-NX-22 probably will not be operational before late 1982.

25X1

25X1

Problems with the development of the SS-NX-22 probably date back to the late 1970s. A missile tube, which was first observed at the Chernomorskoye site in September 1977, was removed in the spring of 1978 and not seen again until April 1979. If the Soviets had begun testing at Chernomorskoye in 1978 as they apparently had planned, the SS-NX-22 could have been ready for deployment on the Sovremennyy in 1981.

25X1

25X1

25X1

25X1

25X1

¹ The Kirov-class cruiser construction program provides further evidence of procurement problems with the 130-mm gun. The Soviets probably intended to equip both units of the class with this new gun, but the first unit was fitted out with 100-mm guns, at least temporarily.

25X1

Top Secret

25X1

25X1

Top Secret

25X1

Udaloy

The Udaloy-class destroyer has not yet been fully equipped with its new SAM system. The primary mission of the Udaloy is antisubmarine warfare (ASW), but we expect it to carry SAMs for its own defense. The first unit of the Udaloy class began sea trials in the Baltic in October 1980 and was transferred to the Northern Fleet area one year later, still without its complete SAM system. A second ship of this class began sea trials in August 1981.

These destroyers have eight circular positions—four forward and four aft—for what may be a new vertically launched point defense system. Two platforms, now empty, probably are intended to hold a radar system associated with this weapon. Thus far, we have not detected such a weapon system undergoing testing. We believe that the circular positions are for an air defense system because no other SAM has been identified on the ship. Moreover, the positions have been installed on the second unit of the Kirov class in place of the SA-N-4 short-range SAM.

We cannot estimate precisely when the Udaloy's new weapon system will be ready for deployment because of a lack of data concerning the test program. One possible platform for at-sea testing of the system is a modified Grisha light frigate now at Feodosiya on the Black Sea. In any case, a period of at-sea testing probably will be required for the missile system, after which the initial units of the Udaloy class probably will return to their shipyards for installation of their SAM systems. Thus, the lead unit of the class may not be fully operational until 1983.

Past Problems

The Soviets have had problems completing the development of naval weapon systems on schedule in the past. They seem to experience their most serious difficulties with ballistic missiles for submarines. The first two variants of the SS-N-18 SLBM did not become operational until early 1978, although six units of the D-III class, for which this missile was intended, had already been deployed to operational bases. The Soviets also had difficulties with the SS-N-14 ASW cruise missile,

which was first deployed on the Kresta II guided-missile cruiser. The lead unit of the Kresta II class completed its sea trials in 1970, but the SS-N-14 did not become operational until 1973.

Implications

These difficulties in meeting naval weapons development schedules in order to match submarine and ship production indicate that the Soviets continue to have problems with tasks requiring a high level of technology. It is easier for the Ministry of Shipbuilding to meet its deadlines for constructing basic naval platforms than it is for the weapons industries to complete complex weapon systems on schedule. Bureaucratic inefficiencies in managing the activities of factories and design bureaus probably also contribute to delays in the weapons production process.

The primary result of the Soviets' failure to complete their SS-NX-20 SLBM, their SS-NX-22 cruise missile, and their new SAM system on schedule is that five major naval units—the Typhoon, two Sovremennyy-class destroyers, and two Udaloy-class destroyers, designed to incorporate the latest advances in weapons technology—are now at sea without some of their weapons. Production rates for these submarine and ship platforms also may be affected by these delays. It has been over a year since the first Typhoon SSBN was launched. The construction program for the Typhoon may well slow down because SALT limitations require the Soviets to dismantle modern SSBNs as newly constructed Typhoon submarines go on sea trials. The Soviets dismantled the launchers on a Y-class SSBN and an older G-class submarine when the first unit of the Typhoon class commenced sea trials. It seems unlikely that they would be willing to give up many more operational SSBNs until the SS-NX-20 for the Typhoon is operational. Production of the Sovremennyy- and Udaloy-class destroyers, on the other hand, is more likely to proceed on schedule, because these ships have been equipped with most of their weapon systems and are not constrained by SALT.

Top Secret

25X1

Top Secret



25X1

Soviet difficulties in developing naval weapon systems are likely to increase as the USSR continues its efforts to introduce more sophisticated submarines and surface ships into its naval inventory. Such problems may have a greater impact on Soviet force planning and production in the future.



25X1



25X1

Top Secret



25X1

Top Secret

25X1

Soviet Truck Production: Military Growth and Civilian Shortfalls

25X1

Soviet truck production has doubled over the past 15 years, the result of the national expansion and modernization program begun in 1965—a program aided by the acquisition of massive amounts of highly productive Western equipment and technology. The USSR produced nearly 800,000 trucks in 1980 and is now the world's third-largest truck manufacturer, after the United States and Japan. The modernization program has enabled the Soviet military to increase the mobility and readiness of its ground forces. Because of the preference given to the military, however, the Soviet civilian sector has not had enough trucks. Civilian shortages are expected to continue, even though plants have begun producing more light trucks for the civilian sector.

Plant Expansion

In 1980, seven plants accounted for 93 percent of total truck output.¹ The table lists the number of military trucks produced by each of the seven major plants. Between 1970 and 1980, the seven plants expanded their floor space by 40 percent. The centerpiece of the expansion and modernization plan is the Kama Truck Plant (KamAZ), which came on line in 1976. When the plant reaches capacity some time after 1985, it will produce 150,000 heavy-duty (8- to 20-ton capacity) diesel trucks plus 100,000 additional V-8 and V-10 diesel engines annually.

We estimate that deliveries of trucks to the military have been growing at a rate of almost 5 percent a year during the past decade, while deliveries to the civilian sector have been increasing at about 3 percent.

¹ The other 7 percent was produced in four small truck plants and two specialty plants. The Minsk Specialized Wheeled Prime Mover Plant (MSKT) and the Bryansk Motor Vehicle Plant (BAZ) are primarily producers of specialized military all-wheel-drive, four-axle trucks used as tank transporters and transporter-erector-launchers. MSKT produces as many as 1,800 trucks a year and that BAZ builds up to 8,400 a year.

Estimated Soviet Military Truck Deliveries, by Major Producer, in 1980

	Estimated Number Delivered (thousands)	Share of Total Plant Output (percent)
Total	185.9	
ZIL (Likhachev Motor Vehicle Plant)	69.1	33.7
Ural (Ural Motor Vehicle Plant)	43.0	62.0
GAZ (Gorkiy Motor Vehicle Plant)	34.0	14.1
UAZ (Ulyanovsk Motor Vehicle Plant)	22.7	19.4
KrAZ (Kremenchug Motor Vehicle Plant)	14.5	50.0
KamAZ (Kama Motor Vehicle Plant)	2.2	3.1
MAZ (Minsk Motor Vehicle Plant)	0.4	1.0

25X1

25X1

Western Inputs

Since 1970, Western countries have supplied Soviet truck plants with about \$2 billion worth of machinery, equipment, and technology. More than 40 percent of this total came from the United States. KamAZ was the largest single importer of Western machinery, acquiring about \$1.5 billion worth, of which more than \$500 million worth came from the United States. The foundries and the diesel engine assembly line were outfitted almost exclusively with US equipment.

25X1

25X1

25X1

The second-largest importer of Western equipment was the ZIL plant, which makes more vehicles for the military than any other Soviet truck producer. Known purchases by ZIL have totaled roughly \$140 million since about 1970, but according to a former ZIL production engineer, the plant had at least \$500 million in hard currency available for foreign equipment purchases between 1976 and 1980. Most of

25X1

25X1

25X1

Top Secret

25X1

Top Secret

25X1

ZIL's known purchases were for equipment to expand and automate truck assembly operations. Aside from GAZ, which obtained about \$80 million worth of equipment from the West in the 1970s—most of it from the United States—the other plants apparently received little or no Western equipment.

Military Has Priority

Soviet military doctrine has emphasized moving ground forces by highway rather than railroad. Roads are considered less vulnerable to permanent disruption, are easier to repair, and offer greater flexibility in the choice of routes.

To provide tactical logistic support, the Soviet military uses three types of trucks: commercial, dual purpose, and specialized. Commercial vehicles are limited to highway travel and are used mainly for rear-echelon supply. Dual-purpose vehicles are all-wheel-drive off-highway trucks that have been modified (with winches, gear mounts, and waterproofed electrical systems, for example) for use with combat troops. Specialized trucks are designed and configured to perform uniquely military functions under wartime conditions (for example, missile transporter-erector-launchers like the MAZ-543 and BAZ-135, and the BM-21 multiple rocket launcher chassis).

One out of five trucks in the USSR is estimated to be in the military—760,000 in a national inventory of about 4 million trucks. The extraordinary demand for trucks stems from the size of the military establishment and the relatively brief useful life of Soviet trucks. The Soviet armed forces have 5.3 million men on active duty compared to 2.1 million in the US forces. In the Soviet military, trucks are replaced, on the average, after eight years of service and, as frequently as every three years in elite units. Trucks have an average useful life of 300,000 kilometers compared to 600,000 km for the US trucks. The average life of the Soviet truck is limited more by the severe operating environment and the lack of adequate roads than by performance deficiencies in the trucks themselves. In fact, the ZIL-131, one of the most common truck models in the Soviet military, performed very well in field tests conducted by the US Army.

In 1980, the Soviet military acquired about 186,000 new trucks,² or almost one-fourth of the total output. In contrast, US military forces obtained fewer than 10,000 trucks in 1980, less than 1 percent of a total production of 1.6 million.

The USSR has traditionally emphasized the production of medium-sized (2- to 5-ton) vehicles to satisfy the needs of the military. Both the US and Soviet military services use medium-duty trucks extensively. Over 40 percent of the US Army inventory is in this class, and over 70 percent of Soviet military trucks are estimated to be in this category. The three key medium-duty trucks used by the Soviet military are shown in the photographs.

The Soviet military requirement for off-road mobility also has a major impact on product mix. Among the major Soviet truck models in production, all-wheel-drive types represent a relatively larger share of production than they do in the United States. Except for the GAZ-66 and the UAZ-469 jeep, which have mainly commercial applications, all-wheel-drive vehicles are used principally by the Soviet military establishment.

The 15-year program, however, has enabled the Soviets to alter the product mix, providing more light-duty trucks for the civilian sector. In 1965, more than three-fourths of the trucks produced were medium-duty trucks, the class historically needed by the military. In 1980 slightly more than half of the trucks produced were in this class.

Outlook

Because of the Soviet military's demand for all-wheel-drive medium trucks, civilian requirements for both light trucks and all-wheel-drive vehicles have not been met. Only 16 percent of the 1980 truck output was composed of light trucks, the class most badly needed by the civilian service industries. Despite recent changes in the product mix, medium-duty trucks still make up about 80 percent of the national truck

² This total includes jeeplike vehicles but not specialized prime movers such as transporter-erector-launchers.

Top Secret

25X1

Top Secret

25X1

Key Soviet Military Truck Models*ZIL-131*

inventory. According to a statement in 1981 by a Gosplan transportation official, the national inventory of light trucks needs to be tripled to meet the requirements of the civilian economy. [redacted]

25X1

Ural-375 D

The military emphasis on all-terrain trucks has intensified the civilian shortage of these vehicles, which are badly needed for civilian off-highway construction projects (for example, oil and gas pipelines) and agriculture. Agricultural areas, where roads are generally primitive or nonexistent, have been short-changed. Of the 1.6 million trucks in the agricultural truck inventory, only about 200,000—less than 13 percent—are all-wheel-drive trucks. [redacted]

25X1

GAZ-66

We believe that the priority claim of the military for new trucks will continue to cause shortages in the civilian sector. Soviet truck manufacturers are still not producing nearly enough light trucks for the service industries, and the military continues to get the lion's share of the all-terrain trucks needed by the civilian sector. [redacted]

25X1

25X1

25X1

Top Secret

25X1

Top Secret

25X1

Readiness Monitoring in the Warsaw Pact Forces

25X1

Warsaw Pact ground forces monitor both the availability and the quality of manning, equipment, and training as measures of combat readiness. There apparently is no integrated Pact-wide readiness reporting system, but similar—often identical—readiness standards and reporting procedures are used throughout the Pact. Readiness reports yield essentially consistent and compatible Pact-wide readiness data, but because the reporting systems reward commanders for consistently meeting individual norms, realism and safety in training reportedly are often sacrificed.

Pact readiness reporting probably provides authorities with generally accurate information, particularly for units in Eastern Europe, where reporting procedures are rigorously followed.

Readiness Responsibilities

Unit readiness is a command responsibility throughout Pact ground forces. In practice, commanders directly monitor manning and training readiness while delegating responsibility for equipment readiness to service chiefs who are functional specialists in areas such as armor, engineering, or communications. Manning and equipment tables, training manuals, and service regulations establish standards for measuring unit readiness. They specify required manning levels, equipment usage and repair criteria, and performance norms for individual, crew, and small-unit training.

Manpower and Equipment Readiness

Pact ground forces monitor the availability of manpower and equipment on a daily basis. Detailed, often hand-kept records originating at the platoon record personnel available or absent from the unit each day.

The technical readiness of Pact equipment is documented and reported using vehicle logs, monthly and annual usage charts, and daily readiness certifications. Logs accompany all equipment and are kept current by equipment operators. They include data on mileage, operating hours, and maintenance history and are easily checked against established equipment readiness standards. Equipment readiness is determined by usage and age standards. For example, as Soviet equipment ages, it becomes less “ready” for use in combat and is successively reclassified from category I (combat ready) through category V (disposal). Monthly and annual usage charts are compiled—probably at battalion and regiment—as readiness management tools to permit commanders to monitor the status of their equipment and to plan future utilization and replacement needs accordingly.


Pact forces also monitor the condition and availability of equipment. The mechanical condition of equipment in regular use is probably certified daily, or at least weekly, throughout the Pact.

Top Secret

25X1

Top Secret

25X1



Throughout the training program, Soviet commanders in particular appear to be obsessed with meeting established norms. [redacted] commanders often sacrifice tactical realism and safety precautions to achieve desired results. [redacted]

25X1

25X1

25X1

25X1

[redacted] There is evidence that some commanders of reduced-strength units in the USSR falsify training records to achieve favorable ratings. Since reduced-strength units are not formally inspected as often as high-strength units, it is likely that such record falsification goes unnoticed for considerable periods.

25X1

Many Pact units lack part of their authorized equipment. This is particularly true of low-strength (cadre) units, which routinely have shortages of some important combat equipment and lack most of their required support vehicles such as trucks. We do not know how or even if these units plan to make up for shortages in such items as missing antitank or artillery equipment. In the case of trucks and other vehicles, however, suitable civilian equipment is identified in nearby civilian enterprises. For a cadre motorized rifle division—some 37 percent of all Pact divisions—this could involve between 500 and 1,500 major pieces of equipment. Mobilization officers register the equipment and inspect it at least annually, certifying its condition and availability for military use. [redacted]

25X1

Mobilization Readiness

Mobilization readiness, [redacted] involves the planned integration of civilian equipment and manpower into reduced-strength units in an organized and timely fashion. Because most Pact ground force units are normally maintained at reduced strength in peacetime, the readiness to mobilize is a major preoccupation of commanders at all echelons. [redacted]

25X1

25X1

25X1

Training Readiness

Training, a qualitative measure of manpower and unit readiness, is monitored by unit commanders aided by technical specialists. Established training standards and manuals provide guidance for programming training. The Soviets and East Germans keep continuous training records on individual soldiers and small units during each phase of training. Each soldier, squad, platoon, and company is graded periodically on its ability to meet specified standards as training progresses. In addition, commanders at battalion and above conduct informal evaluations for their own use every four to six weeks. The results are used to assist these commanders in formulating monthly training schedules. Training readiness is officially evaluated during semiannual or annual training tests. The results of these tests become the official record of training status. [redacted]

25X1

Commanders of divisions and independent nondivisional units are ultimately responsible for regimental mobilization plans, but mobilization responsibilities are delegated to specialists whose full-time job is to maintain mobilization plans and to monitor readiness for mobilization. Mobilization chiefs correspond regularly with local drafting authorities to keep reservist locator cards current and inspect civilian supplies and vehicles assigned to the unit upon mobilization. Elaborate regimental mobilization plans are maintained in "mobilization rooms." Each plan is a detailed time-phased blueprint indicating when and where regimental units are to mobilize and specifying personnel, supplies, and equipment to be used during unit mobilization. [redacted]

25X1

25X1

Top Secret

25X1

Top Secret

25X1

The mobilization room also reportedly contains card files on all reservists destined for callup, lists of positions for these reservists in subunits, "kits" with maps and TO&Es for all regimental subunits, and work spaces for command and staff personnel to study mobilization plans. [REDACTED]

Mobilization officers survey unit needs and update or revise mobilization plans as needed and on a periodic schedule. [REDACTED]



among Soviet and non-Soviet systems. We have not, however, been able to detect an integrated Pact-wide common standard or readiness reporting system. Indeed, what evidence we do have suggests that each country's system retains unique characteristics and that there is, for now at least, no central mechanism for monitoring the readiness of forces on a current, Pact-wide basis. [REDACTED]

National systems permit authorities to manage training, to evaluate compliance with standards, and to prepare for mobilization. These systems, in typical Soviet style, are highly detailed, imposed from the top down, and leave little room for local initiative. They depend heavily on measurable standards, or "norms," and evaluation of a unit's—and by extension, a commander's—proficiency is based in large measure on meeting these norms. Accordingly, the norms receive slavish attention and are as much an objective as the readiness goals they are established to achieve. [REDACTED]

With the exception of high-strength units, which constitute less than 33 percent of Warsaw Pact divisions, formal inspections are infrequent, and the monitoring systems are subject to regular abuse. It is questionable whether these systems, with all their precise standards and frequent reports, provide an accurate picture of unit readiness for the bulk of the ground forces on a current basis. Padding and falsification of records may cause Pact commanders to overestimate the available equipment or the combat capabilities of some units at any point. [REDACTED]

Nonetheless, to the extent that manning and equipment figures are reported accurately and mobilization plans are maintained effectively, these data provide the basis for matching resources with requirements and for managing the rapid mobilization of the force. The quality of mobilized forces is yet another question. [REDACTED]

Conclusion

Pact systems to monitor readiness encompass a series of status reports and evaluations which assess the availability and proficiency of units to accomplish assigned missions. Combat readiness standards and monitoring activities play a prominent role in the daily concerns of Pact commanders at all echelons. Standards are pervasive; reporting requirements are detailed; and there is a high degree of commonality

Top Secret

25X1

Top Secret

25X1

Changes in Latest Soviet Statistical Handbook

25X1

An unusually large reduction in the size of the latest edition of the USSR's main statistical handbook, *Narodnoye khozyaystvo SSSR* (Narkhoz), aroused suspicion that the Soviets had made correspondingly large cuts in the amount of economic data they were publishing. In fact, however, there were few deletions of significance. The slimming down of the handbook was attributable mainly to a consolidation of data which reduced the number of tables.

Erosion of Useful Published Data Accelerated in Mid-1970s

Though concealment of data did not increase appreciably in Narkhoz 80, there is no reason to believe that the trend of growing impoverishment of Soviet statistical reporting has ended. The reduced flow of useful Soviet economic statistics began in 1967 and sharply accelerated in the mid-1970s with the onset of an abrupt economic slowdown in the USSR.

The erosion of useful published information has been particularly evident in—though not limited to—Narkhoz. Indeed, changes in Narkhoz, as the USSR's most comprehensive statistical handbook, have generally been a good barometer of changes in the overall volume of relevant economic statistics released by the Soviets. The largest cut in economically worthwhile data—120 tables—was made in the 1976 handbook published in 1977.¹

Regional statistics were sharply reduced in the 1976 handbook. The deletions included statistics on the rates of growth of industrial production and agricultural development by republic and economic region. Data on the production of various industrial products—oil, gas, coal, cast iron, steel, cement, and cotton fabrics, for example—broken down by republic

¹ Ironically, the 1976 volume was larger than its predecessor, but the increase was largely attributable to the addition of numerous tables aimed not at providing illuminating economic statistics but at glorifying the USSR on the 60th anniversary of the revolution. With the exception of this edition, Narkhoz has been getting steadily smaller.

also disappeared from the handbook for 1976. Narkhoz 77, from which 65 more tables were eliminated, excluded substantial amounts of data—on agriculture and investment, for instance—by economic regions and administrative regions other than federated republics, perhaps to mask uneven territorial development. Some of these data are still published in regional annuals, however, suggesting that the Soviets are content to make it harder, rather than impossible, to find at least a portion of the data excised from Narkhoz.

Reduced reporting of economic statistics has been accompanied by reduced information on how statistics are derived. Both Narkhoz 79 and Narkhoz 80 omitted most of the methodological notes included in previous editions.

The disappearance of data extends beyond the annual statistical handbook. For example, the Soviet foreign trade handbook, *Vneshnyaya trgovlya SSSR*, cut out a substantial amount of significant data on Soviet trade with individual countries in the volume published in 1978, covering 1976 and 1977. Perhaps underscoring Soviet sensitivity over the USSR's emerging energy problems, that edition of *Vneshnyaya trgovlya* eliminated country-by-country figures on the physical quantity of Soviet oil and gas exports. Only data on the value of these exports were preserved.

Data Changes in Narkhoz 80

The reduction in the size of the latest handbook was the largest in several years. The number of pages fell from 616 to 582, the number of tables from 734 to 693. However, little information of value was lost. Only in one instance was concealment an apparent motive for deletion; data on life expectancy, which in previous editions had shown a decline for all ages between 5 and 60 from 1958-59 to 1971-72, was removed. Expected years of life remaining decreased most sharply for those reaching age 20 and age 30. The removal of this data emphasizes Soviet embarrassment over a rising crude death rate that has had

Top Secret

25X1

Top Secret

25X1

its greatest effect on males aged 20 to 44—perhaps due in large measure to the rise in alcoholism and alcohol-related deaths and injuries.

Narkhoz 80 omitted three tables on industrial wholesale prices. Concealment of data, however, appears an unlikely motive for these omissions, since two of the three tables were published in *Vestnik statistiki*, the monthly publication of the Central Statistical Administration, shortly after Narkhoz 80 appeared.²

There was one addition of note in Narkhoz 80. For the first time, the handbook included a series in constant prices—expressed in 1973 rubles, not simply as index numbers—for national income utilized. The data are given for three successive five-year periods, starting with 1966-70, but an annual series can be constructed using available index numbers for individual years.

One table in Narkhoz 80 has been changed without explanation. Figures for total road length, dating back to 1965, have been revised downward. One possibility is that Soviet statisticians may have redefined roads to exclude dirt roads.

None of the remaining changes seems of any great economic or political significance. In all, there were 25 deletions of tables with information that does not appear elsewhere in Narkhoz 80. Eleven of these tables appeared either in 1979 alone or only in 1976 and 1979. In some instances the tables were removed presumably because the data they contained were not part of a continuing series. For example, two of the tables—a) distribution of population by source of income and b) number of families by size—that appeared only in Narkhoz 79 provided statistics obtained from the 1979 census. Other omitted tables—for example, one with information on publication of books by Marx, Engels, and Lenin for years of Soviet rule—appear to have been included in the first place only for propaganda reasons.

² In contrast to the publication of regional data in regional handbooks only, publication of the wholesale price indexes in *Vestnik statistiki* but not in Narkhoz probably does not indicate an effort to make it harder to find the information. We reach this conclusion because the information was placed in a single issue of a well-known and easily accessible publication.

Twenty-eight tables were added to Narkhoz 80. Several of the additions apparently reflect leadership efforts to convince the populace that its standard of living continues to rise despite the hard reality of food shortages and rising prices for luxury goods. An example is a table on openings of cinemas, clubs, and houses of culture. Nine of the new tables present information absent from Narkhoz 79 but included in previous volumes. Much of the data in previous editions were based on the 1970 census, with figures for subsequent years extrapolated from 1970. The publishers apparently opted to wait for results of the 1979 census rather than print figures in Narkhoz 79 from a data base almost a decade old.

The other alterations reflect consolidation and streamlining. Sixteen tables with identical information retained elsewhere in Narkhoz 80 were deleted. In addition to elimination of these redundancies, 46 tables in Narkhoz 79 were condensed into 18 tables in Narkhoz 80. An example is the combining into one table of data—formerly scattered over three tables—on harvest of sugar beets by republic, yield of sugar beets by republic, and procurement of sugar beets by republic. One consequence of the consolidation process is a more limited presentation of time-series data. In many of the consolidated tables, the number of years or time periods listed has been reduced from 18 or 20 to 8 or 10. Such consolidation could complicate statistical analysis. Thus, if Soviet statisticians change a figure in a series aggregated into five-year periods, reconstruction of the data into an annual series is made more difficult, and in some cases impossible.

25X1

Top Secret

25X1

Top Secret

25X1

Top Secret